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DOUBLE JEOPARDY: "TWICE IN JEOPARDY" 
Paul C. Giannelli JUN 1 9 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
This article examines the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Double jeopardy issues can be divided into two general cat-
egories. First, the meaning of the term "same offense" rais-
es a number of issues, such as the dual sovereign doctrine 
and the criminal-civil law distinction. See 2 Katz & Giannelli, 
Ohio Criminal Law chs. 72 & 73 (1996). Second, the term 
"twice in jeopardy" raises another series of issues. T[lis arti-
cle focuses on these latter issues. A future article will exam-
ine the former issues. 
OVERVIEW 
Acquittals. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial if 
there has been a jury verdict of acquittal or its functional 
equivalent, such as a directed verdict (Criminal Rule 29) by 
the trial court or a reversal of a conviction by an appellate 
ardy attaches when the jury is sworn- is binding on the 
states. Thus, the Court reaffirmed the purpose of the prohi-
bition, which is not simply to prevent double convictions and 
multiple punishments for the same offense but also multiple 
trials. The federal rule promotes "minimization of hamssing 
exposure to the harrowing experience of a criminal trial, and 
the valued right to continue with the chosen jury:' As Justice 
Blackmun pointed out in his concurring opinion, the federal 
rule also prevents ''the possibility of prosecutorial overreach-
ing in the opening statement" and minimizes the possibility 
that an innocent defendant may be convicted. /d. at 39. 
Pretrial Rulings 
. court for insufficient evidence. Implied acquittals involve sit-
~' Jations where the accused is found guilty of a lesser includ-
ed offense; this result precludes retrial on the greater of-
fense. 
Since jeopardy does not attach until the jury is sworn (or 
until evidence is introduced in a bench trial), the state is free 
to appeal all pretrial rulings, suppression motions, and dis-
missals favorable to the defendant. If these rulings are re-
versed on appeal, the prosecution may then proceed to trial. 
See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 393 (1975) ("an 
accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double 
jeopardy"); State v. Larabee, 69 Ohio St.3d 357, 359, 632 
N.E.2d 511 (1994) ("By applying Serfass to the case before 
us, we conclude that jeopardy did not attach when the trial 
court granted the appellee's [pretrial] motion to dismiss the 
indictment."). 
Dismissals. In contrast, a dismissal on legal grounds 
unrelated to guilt or innocence will not preclude a retrial. 
Mistrials. A reprosecution following a mistrial is permit-
ted if (1) the defense requested the mistrial (unless the 
request was cause by the prosecution with the intent to 
provoke a mistrial), or (2) there is a "manifest necessity." The 
term "manifest necessity" is not a self-defining term and cov-
ers a wide gambit of circumstances, including hung juries, 
defective indictments, defense misconduct, and so forth. 
ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY 
When the United States Supreme Court applied the dou-
ble jeopardy prohibition to the states in Benton v. Maryland, 
395 U.S. 784 (1969), it did not specifically establish the point 
in time when jeopardy attaches. The Court had held in fed-
eral cases that jeopardy attached in jury trials when the jury 
is sworn and in bench trials when the first witness is sworn. 
Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975). After Benton, 
it was unclear whether states would be free to select a dif-
ferent time in the proceedings. 
In 1978, the Court confronted this issue in Crist v. Bretz, 
437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978), holding that the federal rule- jeop-
Guilty Pleas 
If the defendant pleads guilty, jeopardy generally attach-
es when the court accepts the plea unconditionally. 3 
LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure§ 24.1(c), at 64 (1984). 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. 
Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984), recognizes a limitation. 
Johnson was indicted for murder, involuntary manslaughter, 
aggravated robbery, and grand theft. At arraignment, the 
defe'ndant offered to plead guilty to the manslaughter and 
theft counts. Over the prosecution's objection, the trial court 
accepted the pleas and dismissed the remaining counts on 
double jeopardy grounds, finding that manslaughter and 
theft were lesser included offenses of murder and robbery. 
The Ohio Supreme Court upheld this decision. The United 
States Supreme Court reversed. According to the Court, 
the multiple prosecution aspect of the Double Jeopardy 
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Clause would not be violated in this context. The defendant 
had never been exposed to conviction on the more serious 
charges; the prosecution was not seeking a second chance 
at conviction; and the plea of guilty could not be considered 
an implied acquittal of the more serious charges. 
Plea Agreements 
The defendant in Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987), 
was charged with first degree murder. He pleaded guilty to 
second degree murder pursuant to a plea bargain, in which 
he agreed to testify against two other defendants. The 
agreement provided that "(s]hould the defendant refuse to 
testify or should he at any time testify untruthfully ... then 
this entire agreement is null and void and the original 
charge will be automatically reinstated." /d. at 4. The trial 
court accepted the plea but withheld sentencing. Adamson 
testified against the other defendants, who were convicted 
of first degree murder. He was then sentenced. The convic-
tions of the other defendants, however, were reversed on 
appeal, and Adamson refused to testify at the retrial. He 
claimed that his obligation to testify under the agreement 
ended when he was sentenced. The prosecution consid-
ered his refusal to testify as a breach of the agreement, 
and Adamson was subsequently tried, convicted of first de-
gree murder, and sentenced to death. In a federal habeas 
proceeding, the federal appellate court ruled that his double 
jeopardy rights had been violated. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court 
acknowledged that absent special circumstances, the 
Double Jeopardy Clause would bar prosecution for first de-
gree murder because second degree murder was a lesser 
included offense. According to the Court, the special cir-
cumstances were Adamson's waiver of his double jeopardy 
claim. The Court believed that the agreement was clear; 
should Adamson not testify after pleading guilty to second 
degree murder, the agreement was void, and he could be 
tried for first degree murder. This agreement necessarily in-
volved a waiver of double jeopardy rights. 
MISTRIALS: IN GENERAL 
The earliest justification for the development of a double 
jeopardy doctrine in England and in this country was the 
premise that defendants should be protected against multi-
ple convictions and punishments. American law has incor-
porated into the Double Jeopardy Clause the right to aver-
dict from the first tribunal to hear the case. However, this 
right is not absolute; unforeseen circumstances sometimes 
prevent a trial from being completed fairly. In an 1824 case, 
United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824), the United 
States Supreme Court stated, "We think ... the law has in-
vested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a 
jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, tak-
ing all the circumstances into consideration, there is a mani-
fest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would 
otherwise be defeated." 
Similarly, in Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949), 
the Court stated that "a defendant's valued right to have his 
trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some in-
stances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials 
designed to end in just judgments:' Even the Warren Court 
opposed a rigid rule that would automatically bar retrial 
whenever a jury is discharged without a defendant's con-
sent. The Court recognized that a rigid rule "would be too 
high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal se-
curity and freedom from government harassment." United 
2 
States v. Jorn, 400 u.s. 470, 480 (1971 ). 
For more than a century after Perez, appellate courts 
seemed to affirm trial judges' findings of manifest necessity 
without close scrutiny. For example, in Gori v. United States, 
367 U.S. 364 (1961), the Supreme Court affirmed a convic- p 
tion obtained at a second trial after the judge at the first trial:; 
had declared a mistrial sua sponte when he determined that 
the prosecutor's questioning of a witness was calculated to 
inform the jury of the defendant's prior convictions. The 
Court was unwilling to review the mistrial ruling because it 
had been granted solely in the defendant's interest. 
A decade later, in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 
(1971 ), the Court scrutinized the trial court's decision more 
carefully, finding that the trial judge abused his discretion 
when he made a sua sponte decision to declare a mistrial. 
That case involved prosecution for willful assistance in the 
preparation of fraudulent income tax returns. The govern-
ment's witnesses were taxpayers who had been assisted by 
the defendant in preparing these returns. The trial judge ad-
vised the first witness, upon suggestion of defense counsel, 
of his privilege against self-incrimination. The witness indi-
cated a willingness to testify and informed the trial judge 
that he had been advised of his rights by the IRS. The trial 
judge did not believe that the witness had been proper-ly in-
formed of his rights and, after learning that the other four 
witnesses were likewise uninformed, immediately declared 
a mistrial so that the witnesses could confer with attorneys. 
The trial court provided no opportunity for the prosecutor to 
suggest a continuance for the legal consultations, nor was 
the defendant given an opportunity to object to the mistrial. 
The Supreme Court held that the judge must consider alter-
natives before aborting a trial. Only in the absence of alter-
natives can there be a manifest necessity for a mistrial. 
The court of appeals found that there were alternatives in 
Cleveland v. Walters, 98 Ohio App.3d 165, 648 N.E.2d 37 
(1994), when it became clear during the reading of the jury's 
verdict that the jury had physically delivered the wrong ver-
dict to the court. As the verdict was read, the members of 
the jury called out. The defense attorney asked that the jury 
be polled, and the jurors unanimously announced that the 
verdict read was not theirs. The trial court found that the ju-
rors' statement of an unanimous verdict in open court before 
delivering a proper written verdict created a manifest neces-
sity for a mistrial because no one should be aware of their 
actions during deliberations. The appellate court concluded 
that there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial because 
the court should have sent the jury back to resolve the ap-
parent error. 
There are two types of mistrials: (1) defense requested 
mistrials and (2) all others (those requested by the prosecu-
tion or declared by the judge). 
DEFENSE REQUESTED MISTRIALS 
The United States Supreme Court has never been willing 
to accept a rigid rule that would automatically bar retrial 
under any circumstance following a mistrial, holding, in-
stead, that in most instances a mistrial granted with the con-
sent or on the motion of a defendant does not bar retrial 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. In United States v. 
Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976), the Court recognized that this 
created a Hobson's choice for the defendant between giving 
up the first jury or continuing a tainted trial. That choice was 
deemed acceptable, however, because the defendant re-
tains primary control over the course of events - continuing 
i \ 
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a trial that may be tainted by prejudicial error or having a 
new trial with another jury. This assumes, of course, that 
the trial court is willing to consider alternatives for curing an 
error before the defendant is forced to seek a mistrial. 
__ Exception 
~ In Dinitz and Jam, the Court recognized an exception to 
this rule. A retrial would be barred when the prosecutor's 
conduct is in bad faith or for the purpose of harassing the 
defendant. Later, in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 
(1982), the Court rejected this standard as too amorphous. 
In its place, the majority adopted a standard which bars re-
trial only when the prosecutorial conduct which gives rise to 
a defendant's motion for mistrial is intended to provoke the 
defendant into moving for a mistrial. 
On cross-examination of the state's expert witness in 
Kennedy, the defense attempted to establish the witness's 
bias by questioning him about an unrelated criminal com-
plaint he had filed against the defendant. The prosecutor 
sought to rehabilitate the witness on redirect by asking 
whether the witness had ever done business with the defen-
dant. When the witness responded in the negative, the 
prosecutor asked, "Is that because he is a crook?" /d. at 
667. At that moment, the defense attorney had to choose 
between the possibility of a prejudiced jury or waiver of his 
client's right to a verdict from that jury. The Oregon Court of 
Appeals agreed with the trial court's finding that it was not 
the intent of the prosecutor to cause a mistrial. Neverthe-
less, the Oregon court held that retrial was barred because 
the prosecutor's conduct, "a direct personal attack on the 
general character of the defendant;' was "overreaching." 
The Court, per (then) Justice Rehnquist, held that "over-
reaching" is an overly expansive standard and reversed. 
r :The Court felt that allowing double jeopardy to act as a bar 
would not necessarily aid the defendant. Justice Rehnquist 
declared, "Knowing that the granting of the defendant's mo-
tion for mistrial would all but inevitably bring with it an at-
tempt to bar a second trial on grounds of double jeopardy, 
the judge presiding over the first trial might well be more 
loath to grant a defendant's motion for mistrial." /d. at 676. 
In State v. Loza, 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 70, 641 N.E.2d 1082 
(1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1120 (1995), the Ohio 
Supreme Court applied this rule: "Only where the prosecu-
torial conduct in question is intended.to 'goad' the defendant 
into moving for a mistrial may defendant raise the bar of 
double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in 
aborting the first on his own motion:· The Court went to find 
that there "is no indication that the state engaged in an in-
tentional act of deception, or that the state intentionally with-
held exculpatory evidence." 
MANIFEST NECESSITY 
Hung Juries 
Hung juries are the most common cause of mistrials. 
The standards governing reprosecution following a mistrial 
were set forth in an 1824 hung jury decision, United States 
v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824). See also Logan v. United 
States, 144 U.S. 263, 297-98 (1892). The Court in Perez 
stated, "We think ... the law has invested Courts of justice 
with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, 
1 whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into 
consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or 
the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated." /d. 
at 580. 
The jury in Richardson v. United S~ates, 468 U.S. 317 
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(1984), acquitted the defendant of one count but could not 
agree on other counts. The trial court therefore declared a 
mistrial, and the defendant claimed that a second trial on 
the remaining counts would violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause because the evidence on the remaining counts was 
insufficient for conviction. The defendant relied on Burks v. 
United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), in which the Supreme 
Court had held that if a defendant obtained an appellate rul-
ing that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to 
convict, a second trial was precluded by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. In short, a finding of insufficient evidence 
is equivalent to an acquittal. The Supreme Court, however, 
refused to extend Burks to the defendant's case. Instead, 
the Court adhered to its long established rule that a retrial 
following a hung jury does not violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. See also State v. Lovejoy, 79 Ohio St. 3d 440, 683 
N.E. 2d 1112 (1997). 
Unavailable Witnesses 
In Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), the 
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed a conviction at a 
second trial where the judge at the first trial had granted the 
government's motion for a mistrial when it was discovered, 
after the jury had already been impaneled, that a key prose-
cution witness had not been located. The trial court dis-
charged the jury over the objection of the defendant, and a 
second jury was impaneled two days later, after the prose-
cution located the witness. 
The Court in Downum found a lack of manifest necessity 
to discontinue the first trial. The Court held that when a jury 
is impaneled and the prosecutor is aware or should be 
aware of the unavailability of a key prosecution witness, dis-
charge of the jury - even if no evidence has been present-
ed at that point- constitutes jeopardy. However, the Court 
declined to make an absolute rule, stating that each case 
must be decided on its own facts. The Court based its find-
ing of lack of manifest necessity in Downum on the trial 
court's failure to consider available alternatives, such as a 
reasonable continuance until the key witness was located or 
granting the defense's motion to dismiss the two counts in 
the indictment for which the missing witness would have 
provided critical testimony. 
Subsequent cases have read Downum to prohibit a retrial 
where the failure to produce the key witness can be attrib-
uted to faulty arrangements by the prosecution. However, 
where a properly subpoenaed witness fails to appear 
through no fault of the prosecution, and there are no viable 
alternatives, retrial will be allowed. See Schulhofer, 
Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 451 (1977). 
Defective Indictment 
' In Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), the 
Supreme Court held that where an indictment suffers from a 
fatal defect and no other alternatives are present but to de-
clare a mistrial, a second trial is not barred. After the jury 
was sworn but before any evidence was presented, the 
prosecutor realized the indictment was fatally defective for 
failing to allege the requisite intent, i.e., permanently deprive 
the owner of his property. Moreover, Illinois only permitted 
amending an indictment to cure formal defects, which this 
omission was not. Further proceedings under the defective 
indictment would have resulted in a reversal of any convic-
tion on appeal. Faced with this prospect, the trial court 
granted the prosecution's motion and declared a mistrial. 
The defendant was re-indicted and convicted after the new 
trial. 
At first glance, Somerville seemed to fall within the rule 
set forth in Downum. Both cases involved prosecutors who 
moved for a mistrial because of their own errors. However, 
the Downum error could have been corrected by granting a 
continuance to enable the prosecution to locate its witness, 
while a mistrial was the only alternative available in 
Somerville. The Court held that the "ends of public justice" 
outweighed the defendant's interest in proceeding to aver-
dict with the first jury. Therefore, under a showing of mani-
fest necessity, the declaration of a mistrial was proper. 
Defense Counsel Misconduct 
In 1978, the Supreme Court decided that when a mistrial 
is declared due to defense counsel misconduct, a showing 
of manifest necessity is not an absolute requirement. In 
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978), a defendant's 
first murder conviction was reversed because the prosecu-
tor withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense. During 
defense counsel's opening statement at the second trial, he 
disclosed to the jury that the state's withholding of informa-
tion had caused the new trial. The prosecutor objected and 
moved for a mistrial on the ground that the defense attor-
ney's misconduct could not be remedied. The mistrial was 
granted, and t_he defendant was subsequently convicted at a 
third trial. The Supreme Court affirmed this conviction de-
spite the failure of the trial judge to expressly find a manifest 
necessity for the mistrial or to consider other alternatives. 
According to the Court, it is within the trial judge's discretion 
to determine if a statement by defense counsel might have 
created juror bias. The Court made clear, however, that its 
relaxed review of the proceedings would be inappropriate in 
cases where the mistrial had been caused by the conduct of 
a prosecutor. 
In State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 190, 429 N.E.2d 
1065 (1981 ), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 934 (1982}, the Ohio 
Supreme Court held that a trial judge did not abuse his dis-
cretion by declaring a mistrial sua sponte. In Widner, the 
defendant's attorneys were found in contempt and removed 
from the courtroom after the jury had been sworn and open-
ing statements had been made. When the defendant then 
stated that he no longer wished to appear in front of the 
judge, he was found in contempt, and the judge declared a 
mistrial. The case was tried subsequently before a new trial 
judge. The defendant entered a plea of no contest. On ap-
peal, he claimed the second trial violated the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the con-
viction on three grounds: (i) there was a "high degree of ne-
cessity" for the mistrial; (2) there were no viable alternatives; 
and (3) a mistrial would best serve the public interest in jus-
tice. 
ACQUITTALS 
The Double Jeopardy Clause bars reprosecution if a de-
fendant has been acquitted. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 
662, 671 (1896). Directed verdicts are treated the same as 
acquittals. An appellate court's decision to reverse for insuf-
ficient evidence is also the functional equivalent of an ac-
quittal. Both of these issues are discussed below. 
DIRECTED VERDICTS 
Directed verdicts (Grim. R. 29) are treated the same as 
acquittals and bar reprosecution. As discussed in the next 
section, dismissals do not bar retrial. The label given to the 
trial court's decision is not determinative; rather, the basis of 
the decision controls. 
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In Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962), the 
trial judge, in the middle of the trial, directed the jury to re-
turn verdicts of acquittal. The Supreme Court held that even 
if the judge's decision was erroneous, it nevertheless was a 
final judgment and could not be reviewed without subjecting 
the defendants to double jeopardy. Similarly, in United 
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977), the 
Court ruled that if the judge enters a judgment of acquittal 
under Federal Criminal Rule 29(c} before the jury reaches a 
verdict, the government may not retry the defendant. Martin 
Linen was distinguished from an earlier case, United States 
v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976), in which a trial judge had de-
clared a mistrial because of a hung jury. The Court in 
Martin Linen distinguished the two cases on the ground that 
Sanford did not involve a judgment of acquittal under Rule 
29(c). In sum, when a lower court makes a determination 
on the merits, retrial is barred by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. 
New Trial Motion 
In Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981 ), the Supreme 
Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause had been vio-
lated when Louisiana reprosecuted a defendant for first-de-
gree murdeJ after the defendant's new trial motion had been 
granted. The Court stated that when a new trial is granted 
because the state has failed to prove its case beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the new trial is barred. The Court, however, 
indicated that the result would have been different if the trial 
judge had granted the motion as a "13th juror'' because he 
entertained personal doubts about the verdict. 
Demurrer 
In Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986), the de-
fense filed a demurrer to several counts, and the trial judge 
sustained the demurrer. The prosecutor appealed the trial 
judge's decision. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled 
that the appeal was not barred by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause because a demurrer involves a pure question of law, 
unrelated to factual guilt or innocence. The United States 
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a demurrer was the 
functional equivalent of an acquittal and therefore barred a 
prosecution appeal or any other further proceedings. The 
key point is not the name of the motion or ruling, but 
whether the trial court is making a directed-verdict- insuffi-
ciency ruling. 
Appeals of Directed Verdicts 
The Court has indicated, however, that there can be an 
appeal from a judgment of acquittal entered post-trial. In 
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 n. 7 (1978), the Court 
stated: "In Jenkins we had assumed that a judgment of ac-
quittal could be appealed where no retrial would be needed 
on remand . . . . Despite the Court's heavy emphasis on the 
finality of an acquittal in Martin Linen and Sanabria, neither 
decision explicitly repudiates this assumption." In this situa-
tion, the critical point is that a retrial is not necessary; if the 
appellate court disagrees with the trial court, the original 
verdict can be reinstated without a new trial. 
DISMISSALS 
Dismissals on grounds unrelated to factual guilt or inno-
cence after jeopardy has attached have proved trouble-
some, with the United States Supreme Court changing its 
position. Originally, in 1975, the Court in United States v. 
Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975}, held that a dismissal differs 
from a mistrial because, in essence, a dismissal represents 
a termination in favor of a defendant. Jenkins was charged 
with refusing to submit to induction in the armed forces. The 
trial court dismissed the indictment because the selective 
service board had failed to consider the defendant's applica-
tion for conscientious objector status. The Supreme Court 
~ .. did not determine whether the trial court's judgment consti-
tuted a resolution of the factual issues against the govern-
ment and would not consider the correctness of the ruling. 
In the Court's view, double jeopardy barred further proceed-
ings after a dismissal favorable to the defendant. 
Several years later, the Court modified Jenkins. In Lee v. 
United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977), the Court said that a re-
trial was not barred where the trial judge, after a two-hour 
bench trial, dismissed the indictment for failure to allege the 
specific intent required by statute, even though the judge felt 
the defendant's guilt had been proven. The Court pointed 
out that, as in Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), the 
only reason a conviction could not be permitted in Lee was 
because the indictment had been improperly drafted. The 
Court stressed that "the order entered by the District Court 
was functionally indistinguishable from a declaration of mis-
trial .... The error, like any prosecutorial or judicial error 
that necessitates a mistrial, was one that could be avoided 
- absent any double jeopardy bar- by beginning anew 
the prosecution of the defendant:' 432 U.S. at 30-31. 
The final demise of Jenkins occurred in 1978 in United 
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978). There, at the close 
of the evidence, the trial court dismissed two of three counts 
because of prejudicial preindictment delay. The jury acquit-
ted the defendant on the third count. The Supreme Court, 
in a 5-4 decision, overruled Jenkins and held that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar appeal or reprosecu-
tion "where the defendant himself seeks to terminate the 
' trial before verdict on grounds unrelated to factual guilt or in-
nocence:' Thus, Scott limited double jeopardy protection to 
favorable judgments on the merits, while Jenkins had enun-
ciated a broader rule that any termination favorable to a de-
fendant after jeopardy attached barred reprosecution. 
RETRIALS AFTER APPELLATE REVERSALS 
With the exception of reversals based on the insufficiency 
of evidence, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar re-
prosecution of defendants who have successfully appealed 
the_ir convictions. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); 
Umted States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964). Two theories 
have been advanced to support this rule: (1) the defendant 
by appealing waives the double jeopardy protection; or (2) 
the defendant is in "continued jeopardy" until the trial is final-
ized. 
For example, in Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400 (1987), the 
defendant was convicted of incest of his stepdaughter. 
During the appellate process, the State discovered that the 
incest statute had not applied to stepchildren at the time of 
the crime. An amendment to the statute, which included 
stepchildren, became effective three months after the inci-
dent in question. The Montana Supreme Court reversed 
Hall's conviction on ex post facto grounds and also conclud-
~d that a retrial for sexual assault was precluded because 
1ncest and sexual assault were the "same offense" for dou-
ble jeopardy purposes. The United States Supreme Court 
· r~versed. The successful appeal of a judgment of convic-
tion, on any ground other than the sufficiency of the evi-
dence, does not bar further proceedings for the same of-
fense. Since Hall's conviction was reversed on ex post facto 
grounds, rather than for insufficient evidence, a retrial on the 
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sexual assault charge was permissible. 
Disparate Verdicts 
If the accused is tried on two criminal charges, one re-
sulting in a verdict of not guilty and the other a verdict of 
guilty, a reversal of the guilty verdict does not nullify the fa-
v?ra_ble judgment on the other offense. The not guilty ver-
dict 1s untouchable; only the charge on which the conviction 
was reversed may be retried. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 
784 (1969). 
Implied Acquittals; Lesser Included Offenses 
By returning a guilty verdict to a lesser offense, the jury 
has acquitted the defendant of the greater offense, and his 
appeal of the lesser conviction does not constitute a waiver 
of double jeopardy on the greater offense. Green v. United 
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 
(1970). Accordingly, if the conviction on the lesser offense is 
reversed, the defendant may be retried for the lesser, but 
not the greater, offense. · 
Insufficient Evidence 
In Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), and Greene 
v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978), the Supreme Court held that 
reversal on appealt?ecause of the insufficiency of the evi-
dence is, in effect, an acquittal and bars retrial. Reversal 
under such circumstances means that the trial court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury because the prosecution 
failed, as a matter of law, to present sufficient evidence to 
justify a guilty verdict. 
In Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988), the defendant 
was sentenced to an enhanced prison term under a state 
habitual offender statute. The statute became operative if a 
defendant had been convicted of four prior offenses. In a 
later habeas proceeding, the defendant was able to show 
that one of the prior convictions had been the subject of a 
pardon, and thus could not be used for enhancement. The 
State, however, announced that it would introduce a differ-
ent conviction, which it had not previously used, to bring the 
defendant within the recidivist statute. The defendant ob-
jected on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that without the 
pardoned conviction, there was insufficient evidence- in 
effect, an acquittal on the recidivist count. 
The United States Supreme Court ruled that a retrial is 
not barred when a conviction is set aside because certain 
evidence was erroneously admitted, even when the review-
in~ court determines that without the erroneously admitted 
ev1dence there is insufficient evidence to support the convic-
tion - provided that the sum of the trial evidence, whether 
erroneously admitted or not, would have been sufficient to 
sustain a guilty verdict. Burks was based on a distinction 
between reversals involving trial errors and those involving 
insufficient evidence. In Nelson, the reversal was based on 
a trial error, and a retrial would afford the accused the 
opportunity to obtain a fair readjudication of guilt free from 
error. Moreover, had he successfully objected to the inad-
missible evidence at trial, the prosecutor would have had 
the opportunity to introduce a different prior conviction to 
support the recidivist charge. 
Weight of the Evidence 
In Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 {1982), the Supreme 
Court, in a 5-4 decision, distinguished between reversals 
based on insufficient evidence and reversals based on the 
"weight of the evidence." Reversal of a conviction based on 
the weight of the evidence does not preclude retrial on dou-
ble jeopardy grounds. A reversal for legal insufficiency is 
like an acquittal because it means that no rational fact-finder 
could have voted to convict the defendant, and that the state 
should not have a second chance to prove what it had failed 
to prove at the first trial. In contrast, a reversal on the 
weight of the evidence signifies only the appellate court's 
disagreement with the verdict. The Court suggested that 
the appellate court be viewed as a "thirteenth juror" and its 
disagreement with the jurors' weighing of the evidence is no 
different from a disagreement among the jurors themselves. 
The Court reasoned, "A reversal based on the weight of evi-
dence, moreover, can occur only after the State both has 
presented sufficient evidence to support conviction and has 
persuaded the jury to convict." In that instance, the "reversal 
simply affords the defendant a second opportunity to seek a 
favorable judgment:' /d. 43. 
RESENTENCING AT RETRIAL 
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721 (1969), 
the Supreme Court held that neither the Double Jeopardy 
nor Equal Protection Clauses precluded an increased sen-
tence on retrial following a successful appeal. In other 
words, the "slate has been wiped clean" by the reversal. 
The Court, however, also held that due process precludes 
increased sentences wheFJ the increase is motivated by vin-
dictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge: 
Due Process of law ... requires that vindictiveness 
against a defendant for having successfully attacked 
his first conviction· must play no part in the sentence 
he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such 
vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defen-
dant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally at-
tack his first conviction, due process also requires that 
a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retal-
iatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge 
In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, 
we have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a 
more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new 
trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively ap-
pear. /d. at 725-26. 
Thus, an increased sentence on retrial is presumptively vin-
dictive, but this presumption may be rebutted by reasons set 
forth in the record. 
The defendant in Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 
(1984), was convicted of making a false statement in a 
passport application and sentenced to a 2-year partially 
suspended sentence with probation. After his conviction 
was overturned, he was retried and convicted. This time he 
was sentenced to two years imprisonment, none of which 
was suspended. The Supreme Court found the presump-
tion of vindictiveness applicable. It also found, however, that 
the record contained reasons that rebutted the presumption 
- namely, an intervening conviction. The increased punish-
ment resulted from a conviction for a different crime, which 
was adjudged after the first trial. 
The defendant in Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 
(1986), was convicted of murder and sentenced to 20 years 
imprisonment. The trial court granted the defendant's mo-
tion for a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. He was 
tried again and convicted. This time he received a 50-year 
prison term. The Court held that Pearce was not violated in 
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this case. Two additional witnesses at the retrial provided 
information concerning the defendant's participation in the 
crime. Evidence of a prior conviction, unknown at the first 
trial, also supported the imposition of an increased sen-
tence. 
!' If the possibility of vindictiveness is absent, as where the , 
second sentence is imposed by a jury that is unaware of the 
first sentence, the higher sentence is permissible. Chaffin v. 
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). 
Capital Cases 
The United States Supreme Court has treated the death 
penalty differently from other sentences. In Bullington v. 
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981 ), the Court refused to 
allow a retrial to impose the death penalty when the first trial 
jury sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment at a sepa-
rate presentence hearing. The Court reasoned: "The pre-
sentence hearing resembled and, indeed, in all relevant re-
spects was like the immediately preceding trial on the issue 
of guilt or innocence. It was itself a trial on the issue of pun-
ishment so precisely defined by the Missouri statutes:' 
Allowing the state in Bullington to have a second chance to 
prove the aggravating circumstances necessary to invoke 
the death penalty would have been the equivalent of allow-
ing reprosecution for the same offense. 
See also Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984); Poland 
v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986); Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 
222 (1994). 
PROSECUTION APPEALS 
In 1907, Congress authorized government appeals in lim-
ited circumstances, e.g., where an indictment is dismissed 
on the basis of the invalidity or construction of a statute. . 
That authority was expanded by the Criminal Appeals Act of \ .. 
1971, 18 U.S.C 3731, permitting government appeals from 
any decision dismissing an indictment, except where the 
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits further prosecution. In 
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), the Supreme 
Court held that the government may appeal a dismissal of a 
federal prosecution without offending the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, except when the dismissal is a judgment of acquittal 
relating to the defendant's factual innocence. A successful 
appeal by the government of a dismissal can now result in 
reprosecution or in reinstatement of a verdict of guilty if the 
dismissal followed such a verdict. United States v. Wilson, 
420 U.S. 332 (1975). 
APPEALS OF SENTENCES 
Increasing a sentence on review poses different double 
jeopardy considerations. Unlike acquittals, criminal sen-
tences are not final judgments and, therefore, double jeop-
ardy does not bar an increase of a sentence on review. In 
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), a divid-
ed Supreme Court allowed the government to appeal a sen-
tence it perceived as too lenient against a defendant found 
to be a "dangerous special offender" under the Organized 
Crime Control Act. According to the Court, double jeopardy 
protections prevent reprosecution after a final judgment of 
acquittal has been reached. Therefore, government appeal 
of a sentence does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, 
since it poses no threat of reprosecution for the same of- \ 
tense. 
